![]() Kagan’s article represents a counterpoint to Van Evera and many of the other articles in this volume that argue for a return to multilateralism, argue against focusing on deterring peer competition, and argue for a return to building US soft power. Thus, even if great power interest converge on a number of key subjects, cooperation on these issues remains hampered by great power competition. ![]() China's rise was accelerated by the global recession, and Chinese actions in the South China seem to suggest that the world still works on power politic rules. ![]() On top of this, I would add that China’s rising economic power will lead to demands from its citizens for greater accountability and living standards (if not full-scale democracy).Īt least one of Van Evera's premises failed to hold true. The US should not pour resources into a future competition with China because 1) China’s rise is still decades away 2) this rise-because of nuclear weapons and the nature of post-industrial economies-will likely not resemble the threat of imperial expansion as it did in the 1930s and earlier and 3) the rising power of nationalism suggests that any Chinese attempt to take over its neighbors will lead it into a Vietnam-like morass. Van Evera’s argument for a concert of great states ready to fight threats to the global commons rests on a fundamental debunking of the China threat. Leffler and Legro at the end of their introduction, by invoking the example of Wilson, frame their exercise as a balancing of idealism with realpolitik that is able to bring the necessary modes of power to bear on world order. Though the authors note how moral issues such as fighting disease, poverty, and tyranny were part of the rhetorical aspect of this strategy, Van Evera’s chapter demonstrates how Bush’s divisive unilateralism has set this agenda back.Īccording to Van Evera the threats to the global commons-nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemic disease, and terrorism-can only be fought through deep cooperation facilitated by a “concert” of powers. As the two authors note, Bush’s emphasis on preventive and pre-emptive intervention has largely been discredited (although Kagan gives a staunch historical defense of why the US has not seen the last of pre-emption or unilateralism). Leffler and Legro organize this book partially as a review of American grand strategy and the Bush Doctrine, but also as a way of learning from this strategy and moving toward a renewal of American power. More importantly, volumes like this should be published regularly: soon we should have another volume with similar names entitled "To Lead the World: American Strategy after Obama." The book is still interesting and relevant today and its insights should surely be evaluated based on what has happened inbetween 2008 and today. The book included some of the biggest names in foreign policy, and the policy advice contained in this volume spanned the theoretical and political spectrum. Written by prize-winning authors and filled with level-headed, far-sighted, and achievable recommendations, To Lead the World will serve as a primary source of political wisdom in the post-Bush era and will add immeasurably to the policy debates surrounding the 2008 presidential election.Īt the time this book came out, it could have been one of the most important books written on foreign policy. They argue persuasively that the kind of leadership that made the United States a great-and greatly admired-nation in the past can be revitalized to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Representing a wide range of perspectives, the writers gathered here place the current foreign-policy predicament firmly in the larger context of American and world history and draw upon realistic appraisals of both the strengths and Best-selling authors such as David Kennedy, Niall Ferguson, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama, and Samantha Power address such issues as how the US can regain its respect in the world, respond to the biggest threats now facing the country, identify reasonable foreign policy goals, manage the growing debt burden, achieve greater national security, and successfully engage a host of other problems left unsolved and in many cases exacerbated by the Bush Doctrine. Legro bring together eleven of America's most esteemed writers and thinkers to offer concrete, historically grounded suggestions for how America can regain its standing in the world and use its power more wisely than it has during the Bush years. ![]() The United States now finds itself vilified abroad, weakened at home, and bogged down in a seemingly endless and unwinnable war. The Bush Doctrine of unilateralism, pre-emptive war, and the imposition of democracy by force has proven disastrous. national security policy is at a critically important crossroads.
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